Efficiency of Insurance Firms with Endogenous Risk Management and Financial Intermediation Activities by Cummins, J. David et al.
 
 
 
CIRPÉE 
Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l’emploi 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 06-16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency of Insurance Firms with Endogenous Risk Management 
and Financial Intermediation Activities 
 
 
 
J. David Cummins 
Georges Dionne 
Robert Gagné 
Abdelhakim Nouira 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mai/May 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
Cummins: The Wharton School 
Dionne: Corresponding author. CIRPÉE and Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, HEC Montréal, 3000, 
Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montreal (Qc) Canada H3T 2A7. Phone: (514) 340-6596; fax: (514) 340-
5019 
georges.dionne@hec.ca 
Gagné: HEC Montréal and CIRPÉE 
Nouira: HEC Montréal 
 
 
The authors thank François St-Cyr for his valuable research assistance and FQRSC and CREF for financial 
support. 
 
Abstract: Risk management is now present in many economic sectors. This paper 
investigates the role of risk management in creating value for financial institutions by 
analyzing U.S. property-liability insurers. Property-liability insurers are financial 
intermediaries whose primary roles in the economy are risk pooling and risk bearing. 
The risk pooling and risk bearing functions performed by insurers are the primary 
determinants of the need for risk management. The main goal of this paper is to test 
how risk management and financial intermediation activities create value for insurers 
by enhancing economic efficiency. Insurer cost efficiency is measured relative to an 
econometric cost function. Since the prices of risk management and financial 
intermediation services are not observable, we consider these two activities as 
intermediate outputs and estimate their shadow prices. The shadow prices isolate the 
contributions of risk management and financial intermediation to insurer cost 
efficiency. The econometric results show that both activities significantly increase the 
efficiency of the property-liability insurance industry. 
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Résumé: La gestion des risques est maintenant présente dans plusieurs secteurs 
économiques. Cette recherche analyse le rôle de la gestion des risques pour créer 
de la valeur économique dans les institutions financières en considérant l’industrie de 
l’assurance responsabilité américaine. Les assureurs sont des intermédiaires 
financiers dont les fonctions premières sont la couverture des risques et le partage 
de ceux-ci. Ces fonctions sont d’importants déterminants des besoins de la gestion 
des risques. Le principal objectif de cet article est de tester comment la gestion des 
risques et l’intermédiation financière créent de la valeur pour les assureurs en 
augmentant leur efficacité économique. Cette efficacité est mesurée à l’aide d’une 
fonction de coût économétrique. Puisque les prix de la gestion des risques et de 
l’intermédiation financière ne sont pas observables, nous considérons ces deux 
activités comme des outputs intermédiaires et nous estimons leurs prix implicites. 
Ces prix implicites isolent les contributions de la gestion des risques et de 
l’intermédiation financière sur les coûts des assureurs. Les résultats économétriques 
montrent que les deux activités augmentent significativement l’efficacité de l’industrie 
étudiée. 
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Efficiency of Insurance Firms with Endogenous Risk Management  
and Financial Intermediation Activities 
 
1.  Introduction 
Risk management is now present in many economic sectors. Although perfect markets finance 
theory provides little rationale for widely held firms to expend resources to hedge unsystematic risk, 
various market imperfections create opportunities for such firms to maximize market value through 
hedging. The principal market imperfections that motivate corporate hedging are corporate income 
taxation (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Smith, 1999; Graham and Rogers, 2002), financial distress 
costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Dionne and Garand, 2003; Dionne and Triki, 2004), investment opportunity 
costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Froot and Stein 1998), information asymmetries (DeMarzo and 
Duffie, 1991), and corporate governance considerations (Dionne and Triki, 2005). Firms also engage in 
hedging for non-value-maximizing reasons such as managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1990, Tufano, 1996; 
Triki, 2005). 
For financial firms, matters are more complicated because the customers are also concerned about 
risk exposure. Banks are heavily regulated because the managers’ behavior may affect the risk of the 
depositors and even the entire financial system (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 2000; Dionne, 2004; Morisson 
and White, 2005). Insurers are also regulated for similar reasons to protect policyholders against 
insolvency (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 2000). Policyholders and depositors cannot diversify their risk 
by using many insurers or banks because this is costly, and they do not perfectly monitor the managers of 
these institutions because monitoring is costly and requires specialized expertise. Moreover, the existence 
of government deposit insurance and insurance guaranty funds reduce incentives for monitoring and 
creates moral hazard. This form of moral hazard may explain the risk taking behavior of managers in both 
industries. Monitoring by customers is also impeded by the opacity of key financial statement items such 
as bank loans and insurance loss reserves. Risk capital is another form of protection (Merton and Perold 
1993). But this is costly and a role for risk management is to reduce risk capital.  
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The objective of this paper is to provide new information on the role and importance of risk 
management in financial institutions by analyzing a sample of firms from the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry. Insurers are financial intermediaries who borrow money from their policyholders in 
the form of premium payments and invest the funds raised in financial assets. Thus, financial 
intermediation is one important activity that generates value for insurers. An equally important economic 
function of property-liability insurers is to provide risk pooling (diversification) and risk bearing services 
to their policyholders, and these services are a primary driver of the need for risk management. Moreover, 
both insurer assets generated by the intermediation function and liabilities generated from the risk pooling 
function are sensitive to inflation and interest rates, creating the need for asset-liability (interest rate risk) 
management. 
The main objective of this paper is to test how risk management and financial intermediation 
activities create value for insurers by enhancing economic efficiency. We argue that risk management and 
financial intermediation are two activities that may be used by insurers to improve efficiency, where 
efficiency is gauged by the capacity to reduce the costs of providing insurance. We measure insurer 
efficiency by estimating an econometric cost frontier. Because risk management and financial 
intermediation are key activities for insurers, we treat these activities as endogenous. And, because the 
prices of risk management and financial intermediation services are not observable, we consider these two 
activities as intermediate outputs and estimate their shadow prices. The shadow prices are then used to 
isolate the contributions of risk management and financial intermediation to insurer cost efficiency, as 
measured by their capacity to reduce costs. 
Another contribution of the paper is to develop a theoretical model of value-added in the 
property-liability insurance industry. This is important because output estimation for financial services 
firms has been based primarily on the value-added approach in the recent literature. Our model represents 
a significant extension and generalization of prior models of value-added in the insurance industry by 
including insolvency risk and explicitly adding risk management as part of value added. The final 
important contribution of this paper is related to the econometric estimation of the cost frontier. Our 
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econometric methodology, borrowed from the exhaustible resources literature (Halvorsen and Smith, 
1991; Chermak and Patrick, 2001), enables us to estimate the shadow prices of risk management and 
financial intermediation. By way of preview, our econometric results show that both activities increase 
significantly the efficiency of the property-liability insurance industry in the United States. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on efficiency 
and performance measures in property-liability insurance. Section 3 analyses outputs of insurers related to 
risk-pooling, financial management and risk management as components of the insurance industry value-
added. Section 4 proposes the econometric model and estimation method, while Section 5 presents the 
data and variables. Section 6 analyses the main results and Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Literature review 
 An extensive literature has developed on the efficiency of financial institutions. A review of the 
literature a decade ago identified 130 financial institution efficiency studies, and the literature has 
continued to grow. (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Cummins and Weiss (2000) review twenty-one 
insurance efficiency studies over the period 1983-1999, and there have been an approximately equal 
number of studies since that time. 
 The state-of-the-art methodology for efficiency estimation is modern frontier efficiency analysis 
(Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1993). Modern frontier efficiency analysis estimates “best practice” efficient 
frontiers consisting of the dominant firms in an industry. The efficiency of other firms in the industry is 
measured relative to the frontiers. Various types of efficient frontiers can be estimated including 
production, cost, revenue, and profit frontiers. Two principal methodologies have been used to estimate 
frontiers: (1) Stochastic frontier estimation using parametric econometric models and (2) non-parametric 
estimation methods such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Both methods have advantages and 
disadvantages, but comparative analyses have shown that they tend to give consistent results when 
applied to the same dataset, in terms of ranking firms by their relative efficiency (Cummins and Zi, 1998; 
Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux, 2004). We adopt the econometric approach in this paper because it 
facilitates the estimation of shadow prices for financial and risk management. 
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 Most of the existing insurance efficiency studies utilize the estimated efficiencies to test various 
economic hypotheses. Insurance efficiency studies have been conducted to test for economies of scale 
(Cummins and Santomero, 1999; Cummins and Xie, 2005), economies of scope (Berger, et al. 2000), and 
the relative efficiency of product distribution systems (Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997; Klumpes, 
2004).  Other studies have considered deregulation and consolidation (Cummins and Weiss, 2000b; 
Mahlberg and Url, 2003; Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006; Hussels and Ward, 2006), capital utilization 
(Cummins and Nini, 2002), and organizational form (Cummins and Zi, 1998; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 
1999; Cummins, Rubio-Misas, and Zi, 2004; Greene and Segal, 2004).  The relationship between market 
structure and performance has been investigated by Ennsfellner, Lewis, and Anderson (2004), Choi and 
Weiss (2005), and Fenn, et al., (2006). There have been approximately an equal number of studies on the 
life and property-casualty (non-life) insurance industries. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, none of the existing insurance efficiency studies considers risk management 
as a potential determinant of firm performance, although some studies have considered the importance of 
solvency risk and overall capitalization (leverage) (e.g., Cummins and Nini, 2002). Several papers have 
analyzed insurer risk management using other methodologies. Staking and Babbel (1995) analyze the 
relationship between capital structure, interest rate risk, and market value for U.S. property-liability 
insurers. The results indicate a non-linear relationship between firm value and interest rate risk and 
support the hypothesis that insurers manage interest rate risk to protect their franchise values. Cummins, 
Phillips, and Smith (2001) analyze the determinants of the use of derivatives by insurers and find 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insurers are using derivatives to manage risk. However, they 
do not test the relationship between derivatives usage and insurer financial performance. Thus, an 
important contribution of the present study in comparison with the previous literature is the explicit 
consideration of risk management as a determinant of firm performance using cost structure analysis.  
Likewise, although most of the prior literature treats insurers as financial intermediaries, none of the prior 
studies has attempted to estimate the shadow price of the financial intermediation function. 
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The lack of prior research in this area is partially due to data limitations – the detailed data needed 
to measure risk management activities with any precision are not yet available to researchers studying 
European or Asian insurance companies. Although more detailed data are available on U.S. insurers, 
some of this information was not available electronically until very recently. We take advantage of the 
more detailed U.S. data, including the recently released electronic databases on certain types of insurer 
risk management activities, to measure the effects of risk management on firm performance. Our database 
is described in more detail below. 
 Although there have been no studies of the insurance industry that explicitly consider the 
relationship between risk management and firm efficiency, there have been a few studies on banking and 
non-financial industries that attempt to make the connection between risk management and performance. 
However, few of these studies have examined risk management in the context of frontier efficiency 
analysis. For example, Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) analyze the use of derivatives by U.S. savings 
and loan associations (S&Ls) and find evidence that S&Ls use derivatives to manage risk – equity return 
volatility is inversely related to the level of derivatives activity and derivative users pay a lower rate on 
large certificates of deposit than non-users. Schrand and Unal (1998), in a study of demutualizing savings 
and loans, show that converting thrift institutions use hedging to reduce exposure to risks that provide 
zero economic rents (such as interest rate risk) and to increase exposure to risks that provide positive rents 
(such as credit risk). Drzik (2005) provides evidence that bank investment in risk management during the 
1990s helped reduce earnings and loss volatility during the 2001 recession. Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004) find evidence that banks engaging in active management of credit risk exposure through the loan 
sales market have lower risk and higher profits than other banks. 
Several studies have analyzed the risk management-performance relationship for non-financial 
firms. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) analyze the use of foreign currency derivatives 
(FCDs) by nonfinancials and find a positive relationship between firm value and the use of FCDs. Nelson, 
Moffitt, and Affleck-Graves (2005) find that nonfinancial firms that hedge using derivatives outperform 
non-hedgers but that the effect is primarily due to the use of FCDs by relatively large firms. Finally, Jin 
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and Jorion (2006) find that risk management has no effect on oil industry firms’ market value, and Dionne 
and Triki (2006) verify that risk management in the gold mining industry increases returns on assets. 
 Another important strand of the banking literature emphasizes the importance of including non-
traditional outputs such as off-balance sheet (OBS) activities as well as controls for risk in estimating 
bank efficiency (e.g., Mester, 1996; Stiroh, 2000; Hughes, et al., 2001; Clark and Siems, 2002; Girardone, 
Molyneux, and Gardener, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2005; Pastor and Serrano, 2005). These studies 
show that failing to account for non-traditional outputs and for risk can lead to misleading efficiency 
estimates and thus reinforce the argument for controlling for such factors in the present study. However, 
this set of papers generally does not focus on the relationship between risk management and efficiency. 
3.  Insurer value-added 
We treat risk management as an answer to policyholders’ demand for reducing solvency risk 
related to insurance contracts. We do not consider other determinants of risk management such as taxes, 
financial distress costs, investment financing or managers’ risk aversion (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 
2000). In other words, in our model only the clients’ risk aversion explains risk management. Without any 
insolvency problems, the risk premium a representative insured is willing to pay over the actuarial value 
of the contract is given by the solution to the following equation: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )(0 0
0
− = −∫L RU W L f L dL U W E L )−π , (1) 
where  is initial wealth of the insurance buyer, L measures a given loss for the insured, 0W ( )f L  is its 
corresponding density, and L  is the maximum possible value of loss. The left hand side is the no-
insurance situation and the right hand side corresponds to the insurance situation, assuming there is full 
insurance coverage, that is  for all L where ( ) =q L L ( )q L  is the insurance coverage of loss L. Rπ  is the 
Arrow-Pratt risk premium for risk-pooling or the maximal amount a risk averse insured is willing to pay 
above the actuarial value of the contract, i.e., the expected loss ( )E L . So the maximal premium for risk-
pooling is equal to ( ) + RE L π . A private monopoly will extract the entire surplus Rπ . Under 
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competition, however, the monopoly rent will be nil and the insurance surplus will be split between the 
policyholders and the insurer. 
If we introduce the possibility of insurer insolvency to the insurance contracting problem 
(Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990; Doherty and Dionne, 1993) and continue to assume, for a moment, that 
the insured still buy full coverage for the insurable loss when he is compensated by the insurer and 
receives no coverage when a solvency problem occurs, the corresponding total risk premium solves the 
following equation:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
0
1− − + − − = − −∫L S Sp U W L P f L dL p U W P U W P0 S Sπ  (2) 
where 
SP  is the actuarial insurance premium for the risk-pooling activity in presence of solvency risk; 
p is the probability of the non-solvency state; 
Sπ  is the total risk premium for both solvency risk and risk pooling. 
Consequently, the insured is willing to pay Sπ  above  to get full insurance and full security 
against solvency risk. It can be shown that 
SP
S Rπ π>  under regularity conditions. We implicitly assume 
here that the insured buys full insurance for the insurable risk, which is a possible solution (Doherty and 
Schlesinger, 1990). This assumption is not necessary to get S Rπ π> . 
There are different types of output measures in the insurance literature (Cummins and Weiss, 
2000). In this study, we use the value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), which is the most 
widely accepted approach in the financial institutions literature.  Under this approach, the output measure 
has four components: a) risk-pooling or direct insurance coverage; b) risk-bearing or risk management; c) 
financial management, and d) financial services related to insured losses (Cummins and Weiss, 2000). In 
this paper, we emphasize the first three components; but our output measures (discussed below) also 
provide excellent proxies for the fourth. 
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If we limit the discussion, for the moment, to the risk-pooling component without solvency risk 
and intermediation, we can measure the corresponding value-added by the difference between the 
insurance premium and the insurance output. As shown in (1), risk averse insureds are willing to pay Rπ  
over the expected losses to get insurance coverage. 
We can write the competitive insurance premium ( )PP  as: 
 
( )
0
1
1
+ += +
q e
P
Q e r
P
r
E
 (3) 
where: 
Q is the expected insurance compensation, under full insurance above a deductible; 
( )( ) >= − L DQ E L D , where D is a deductible; 
eq is the insurer expenses as a proportion of expected compensation; 
E is total equity; 
re is the return required by equity holders to invest in the insurance industry; 
0r  is the risk-free interest rate required by policyholders. 
 So, the corresponding value-added can be written as: 
  ( ) 0p P P eV P P E r Q r E= + + − −  
or, equivalently, as: 
  0= +P qV e Q r E  
which corresponds to the fraction of the risk premium available to the insurance industry under 
competition. It is equal to the insurer expenses for direct insurance plus the investment return on equity. 
Insurers can improve this added value by offering more insurance at a lower cost. 
 The corresponding price of insurance for risk-pooling is then equal to: 
  Price 0 0
0
1
1
− += =
+
P
q
QP r EeQ Q
r
+ r . (4) 
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This price is observable or measurable. We may add the intermediation component by defining 
 where m is the net interest margin received by the insurer for performing the 
intermediation function,  is the required interest rate by policyholders under market risk ( ) , and 
 is the investment return obtained from the financial intermediation function. We still assume here that 
there is no solvency risk and, to simplify the notation, the financial intermediation expenses are included 
in . The corresponding total value-added for risk pooling and financial intermediation can be written 
as (Cummins and Weiss, 2000): 
( ) ( )(1 1 1a pr r+ = + + )m
pr 0>pr r
ar
qe Q
  ( )( ) ( )1PF q e q aV m Q e r E e Q r E= + + + + . (5) 
The intermediation function creates additional added value via two effects:  and when m > 0 or 
when the required return by policyholders  is smaller than the investment return . 
0ar r>
pr ar
 One contribution of this paper is to add explicitly the risk-bearing or risk management component 
to this definition. If we now assume that the policyholders value the security offered by insurers that hold 
capital to cushion unexpected losses and investment shocks due to random interest rates, for example, this 
means that the value-added of insurance should contain an extra source. We can introduce this extra 
source by supposing that the expected compensation is random without risk management activities by the 
insurer. For example, the expected compensation can be written as ( )1− p Q , where p is the probability of 
the non-solvency state, which implies that the expected loss due to insolvency is pQ. For a risk averse 
insured, this supplementary random variable represents an additional risk with respect to his loss net of 
insurance coverage and, as shown above, he is willing to pay a total premium SP Sπ+  to reduce or 
eliminate this additional risk along with the insurable risk. For simplicity, we define h as the hedging ratio 
of the additional risk ( )0 ≤ ≤h 1 . When 1=h , the insurer has eliminated the extra risk and when 0=h , 
the insurer does not hedge at all this additional risk. We suppose that h is observable in the market and 
that  is the additional proportional cost related to risk management. he
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 Consequently (3) becomes: 
 
( )( )
( )
1
1
+ − + += +
e
PFM
h
Q r E p ph e Q
P
r
hq , (6) 
where ehq is insurer expenses including the risk-management activity ( )= +hq q he e he  and  is the 
required interest rate by policyholders under market and solvency risk. We implicitly assume that it is 
optimal for the equity holders to manage this additional risk on security markets (so  is not modified). 
Insurer expenses are not subject to solvency risk, i.e., the solvency risk occurs at the end of the 
contracting period after all expenses 
hr
er
( )hqe Q  have been paid. However, both the equity holders’ income 
and the policyholders’ loss recoveries are subject to the solvency risk. When  (only the 
market risk remains) and when . Solvency risk also affects the value of the net interest 
margin received by the insurer for performing the intermediation function, when  > . So 
, where  is the investment return and  is the net interest margin under 
market and solvency risk. 
1,= =hh r pr
pr
)rm
1,< >hh r
hr pr
( ) ( )(1 1 1a hr r+ = + + ar rm
 The total value-added then becomes equal to: 
 ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )1PFM r hq e q a hV m e Q p ph Q r E e Q r E e hQ c= + − + + + + + − h  (7) 
which is the value added from intermediation, plus the value added from risk-pooling, plus the value 
added from risk management. ( )c h  measures cash outflows that can be paid for some risk management 
activities such as reinsurance or consultant services. In the Appendix, we derive explicitly equation (7). 
 For property-liability insurers, it is usually possible to measure the risk-pooling insurance output 
and its corresponding price, as given in (4). Matters are much more complicated for the financial 
intermediation and risk management activities. To solve this problem, we propose to treat these two 
activities as intermediate outputs that have separable quantities of inputs from those used in the risk-
pooling activity. So we will be able to estimate the shadow prices of both the financial intermediation and 
the risk management activities. The financial intermediation intermediate output will be measured by the 
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invested assets, while the risk management intermediate output will be associated to the dollar duration of 
surplus (insurer equity capital) defined as the difference between the dollar duration of assets and the 
dollar duration of liabilities. By dollar duration we mean duration in years times monetary value. High 
risk management output will correspond to small dollar duration surplus. We know this is limited to a 
first-order approximation but it corresponds to a good proxy of risk management. 
 With the above formulation of risk management, its benefits are not limited to the increase in firm 
value but are also transferred to the policyholders. One interesting result will be to test whether the 
presence of risk management improves the efficiency of insurance-pooling and reduces its costs. 
4.  Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
We assume that insurance services ( )Q  are produced using a vector of inputs ( )AX  and two 
intermediate outputs – financial intermediation and risk management – according to the following 
production function: 
 ( ) 0,,,,; =TZXFRQY A , (8) 
where Z  is a vector of control variables which may contain quasi-fixed inputs, and T  represents time 
(for simplicity, we omit the time and firm subscripts). R and F are the intermediate outputs representing 
risk management and financial intermediation activities. 
The technology associated with the production of risk management is defined as: 
 ( )TZXRR R ,,= , (9) 
where RX  are inputs used in the production of risk management. Similarly, the technology associated 
with financial intermediation: 
 , (10) ),,( TZXFF F=
where FX  are inputs used in the production of financial intermediation. 
Under the assumption that insurance firms are cost minimizers, and that , Q R , and  are pre-
determined, the restricted cost function associated with the technology described by (8), (9) and (10) is: 
F
 ( )TZPPPFRQCRCR FRA ,,,,,,,= , (11) 
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where  are total costs, and CR AP , RP , and FP  are, respectively, the prices of inputs AX , RX  and 
FX . The restricted cost function defined by (11) gives the minimum cost of producing the level of 
insurance services Q , given the levels of risk management and financial intermediation undertaken by the 
firm (R and F), the different input prices ( AP , RP , and FP ), the state of the control variables ( )Z , and 
time ( , which is included to take into account technical change. )T
Following Halvorsen and Smith (1991), we obtain the implicit (or shadow) prices of risk 
management ( )μ and financial intermediation ( )λ  using the partial derivatives of the restricted cost 
function with respect to R  and F : 
 
R
CR
∂
∂−=μ , (12) 
and 
 
F
CR
∂
∂−=λ . (13) 
Since the exact functional form of the restricted cost function defined by (11) is unknown, we use 
the well known translog approximation which is given by: 
  (14) 
,sln
lnlnln
lnlnlnln
it
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it
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it
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iit
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FRQCR
++−++
+++
+++=
∑
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∑
ββ
βββ
βββα
where subscripts i  and t , represent, respectively, firms and time, and  are time dummy variables (the 
sample first year being the omitted category). The coefficients associated with the time dummy variables 
can be used to compute industry-level technical change. The intercept 
tD
( )iα  and the coefficients 
associated with the risk management and financial intermediation variables (  and ) are firm-
specific, allowing, among other things, for firm-specific estimates of the risk management and financial 
intermediation shadow prices. 
R
iβ Fiβ
iα  will also be used for the analysis of insurance-pooling efficiency. For 
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the estimation, we treat these three parameters as random variables which follow a normal distribution 
with means α , ,  and variance-covariance Rβ Fβ Ω . Finally,  are i.i.d. random disturbances. itu
Linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed prior to estimation by dividing total 
costs and all input prices but one by this last price. Finally, all continuous variables on the right-hand side 
of (14) are divided by their sample mean (the point of approximation). 
The risk management (  and financial intermediation )R ( )F  variables are likely to be 
endogenous. The set of instruments used includes the log of the output and input prices, the time dummy 
variables and other dummy variables measuring insurer’s characteristics such as the ownership structure, 
group membership, and credit quality.1 The predicted values of each endogenous variable are obtained 
from an OLS regression on the set of instruments and are substituted to the actual values in equation (14). 
Equation (14) is then estimated by restricted/residual maximum likelihood (REML) as it is implemented 
in the Mixed Model procedure of SAS. The proper test statistics of the different estimated parameters of 
the model are obtained by running 5,000 simulations.2
Shadow prices for risk management and financial intermediation intermediate inputs are 
computed from (14) using the following equations: 
 
it
it
it
it R
CR
R
CR
ln
ln
∂
∂−=μ  (15) 
and 
 
it
it
it
it F
CR
F
CR
ln
ln
∂
∂−=λ . (16) 
It is possible to compute the shadow prices for each observation in the sample only because they 
are functions of variables specific to each observation. However, recall that the translog approximation of 
the restricted cost function includes firm-specific coefficients associated with the risk management and 
financial intermediation variables. Their estimated values are used to compute itRCR lnln ∂∂  and 
                                              
1 See Section 5 (Data and Variables) for an exact description of the variables used. 
2 5,000 samples are generated using the estimated distributions of  and Ru Fi
R
iiit ,,,, ββα F  obtained by maximum 
likelihood (ML). Then, for each generated sample, equation (14) is estimated again by ML. At the end, proper test 
statistics for each estimated parameter of the model are computed from these 5,000 estimates. 
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itFCR lnln ∂∂ . A higher shadow price for a specific insurer (compared to other insurers) indicates the 
potential cost reductions that could be realised by increasing risk management or financial intermediation 
activities. A shadow price near zero indicates that an insurer has already internalized the benefits of risk 
management and financial intermediation into its cost structure. A negative shadow price would be an 
indication of an over production of risk management or financial intermediation activities. 
Finally, the relative residual efficiency of each firm in the sample can be computed using the 
stochastic part of the cost function. This is the efficiency that cannot be attributable to any specific input 
or intermediate output. Two efficiency measures are used. The first one is analogous to the measure 
proposed by Berger (1993): 
 ( )min(1) expiEfficiency iα α= − . (17) 
It defines relative efficiency as the ratio of the minimum cost needed (costs of the fully efficient firm) to 
the actual costs expanded. To measure the relative efficiency of insurance firm i, we also consider relative 
inefficiency defined as the ratio of the actual costs expanded to the maximum cost needed (costs of the 
fully inefficient firm). Under the alternative definition efficiency is given by: 
 ( )max(2) 1 expi iEfficiency α α= − − . (18) 
5.  Data and Variables 
5.1. Data 
The primary database for our project consists of the regulatory annual statements filed by U.S. 
property-liability insurers with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). We use 
data for all property-liability insurance firms that report to the NAIC for the period 1995 through 2003. 
However, we eliminate reporting firms showing negative surplus, assets, losses or expenses. Such firms 
are not viable operating entities but are retained in the database by the NAIC for regulatory purposes such 
as the resolution of insolvencies. Because insurers formulate investment and risk management strategies 
at the overall corporate level, our analysis focuses on groups of insurers under common ownership and 
unaffiliated single insurance firms. Data for insurance groups are obtained by aggregating the data for 
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affiliated insurance firms which are members of the group. The resulting sample consists of 9,854 
observations for the 9-year period. 
Our analysis is limited to multiple line insurance firms reporting strictly positive output in each of 
the four lines of insurance business: long-tail personal, short-tail personal, long-tail commercial and short-
tail commercial, where the length of the tail refers to the length of the claims payout period for the line of 
business.3 However, for robustness and industry representation results, we also consider a larger sample 
of firms obtained from the aggregation of the four outputs into only one. In that case, only insurance firms 
with non-strictly positive total output were deleted. Also, insurers reporting negative input prices or 
surplus duration have been deleted. Our final samples consist of 9,129 observations for 9 years when we 
use a single total output, and 3,303 when we use outputs from four lines. 
Although the restriction of the smaller sample to insurers with strictly positive outputs in all four 
lines reduces the sample size, most of the firms eliminated are small specialist firms.  In fact, the sample 
of firms with strictly positive output in all lines accounts for about 84 percent of total industry premium 
volume in 2003, and the larger sample based on the single output accounts for about 93 percent of total 
premiums.  Thus, because the use of four outputs is likely to give more reliable results and because most 
of the firms eliminated by the strictly positive output criterion are small specialists, our preferred results 
are based on the smaller sample of firms active in all four major output categories. 
5.2. Variables 
 5.2.1. Intermediate Outputs 
 The quantity of output associated with financial intermediation activities is invested assets 
(Invested Assets). The dollar duration of the surplus (Asset-liability Risk) is used as a proxy of the quantity 
of output associated with risk management activities.4 The dollar duration of the surplus is defined as: 
SDS = A DA – L DL, where DS is the duration of surplus, DA is the duration of assets, DL is the effective 
duration of liabilities, A is the market value of invested assets, L is the liability (losses and loss adjustment 
expenses reserves). The surplus of the firm is immunized (DS = 0) when the effect of the interest rate 
                                              
3 Our classification of lines as long-tail and short-tail is based on Schedule P of the NAIC annual statement. 
4 Surplus is the term used for the book-value of equity capital in the insurance industry. 
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changes on assets is equal to the effect of interest rate changes on liabilities. We are not assuming that nil 
duration of surplus is optimal for insurers and we take the dollar duration of the surplus as a measure of 
the quantity of risk that is left by the risk management activities. We assume that more insurers’ risk 
management activities imply a smaller dollar surplus duration which contributes to increase the insurer’s 
value added for the policyholders. 
 When the security’s cash flows are independent of the interest rate movements, as is the case for 
bonds, we calculate the Macaulay duration. When the security’s cash flows can change with interest rate 
movements, as is the case with insurance liabilities, we calculate the effective duration. To estimate the 
effective duration of a cash flow, Ahlgrim, D’Arcy and Gorvett (2004) calculate the present value of the 
expected cash flow in three ways. The first present value PVo is based on the original term structure. The 
second present value PVup is based on a new term structure that is generated if the observed interest rates 
are increased by a specific amount ( rΔ ). The third present value PVdown is based on another term structure 
that is generated if observed interest rates are decreased by the same specific amount ( rΔ ). The effective 
duration ED is then obtained as: 
rPV
PVPV
ED
o
updown
Δ2
−= . We use data from schedule D of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) insurance regulatory statement to compute the duration 
of each security owned by the insurance firm as of December 31. For each bond, we estimate the implied 
yield to maturity from the reported statement value and then we calculate the duration. We consider 
preferred stocks as perpetual bonds to calculate their duration. We assume that the duration of common 
stocks is equal to the duration of S&P 500 (Staking and Babel, 1995). The duration of the S&P 500 is 
computed as the duration of perpetual bonds. Finally, we measure the duration of invested assets as the 
value weighted duration of all securities, including cash with nil duration. 
To calculate the effective duration of liabilities, we proceed in four steps. In the first step we use 
the cumulative paid losses and allocated expenses from schedule P part 3 of the NAIC insurance 
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regulatory statement to estimate the cash flows patterns.5 In the second step, we estimate the real value of 
the future payments.6 The third step consists in an inflation adjustment of the future payments to take 
account of the fact that insurers hold reserves in nominal value.7 In the last step, we discount the future 
payments and we calculate the effective duration.8
5.2.2. Output Quantities and Output Prices 
Output quantities are calculated every year for each business line: Long-tail personal, Short-tail 
personal, Long-tail commercial and Short-tail commercial. We also use a measure of aggregated output 
(Total Output) which is the sum of the four outputs. For a subset of data with the aggregated output, we 
add two qualitative variables to account for the insurer’s output characteristics. The first qualitative 
variable is the output of personal lines as a proportion of total output (Proportion of personal). The 
second qualitative variable is the proportion of long-tail lines in total output (Proportion of long-tail). The 
output quantity for a given year t is defined as the present value of incurred losses arising only from the 
exposure related to the premiums written during the year t. Losses paid during the year t but arising from 
exposures related to the premiums written during previous years are not included in the year’s t output 
                                              
5 We deflate the paid losses each year to the real 1995 values based on the consumer price index (CPI). We adopt the 
chain ladder method to estimate the percentage of ultimate losses that is paid in each development year (Taylor 
2000). Because the payout pattern differ between the principal types of insurance’s business, we estimate a different 
chain ladder parameter for personal lines long-tail losses, personal lines short-tail losses, commercial lines long-tail 
losses and for commercial lines short-tail losses. In each year, we estimate the same chain ladder parameters for the 
whole property-liability insurance industry. 
6 We determine the real values of incurred losses by accident year as the sum of the real values of unpaid losses and 
the real value of paid losses. Then we applied the chain ladder parameters found in the first step to calculate the real 
value of losses that will be paid in the future development years. 
7 We assume that inflation and risk free interest rates are linearly correlated. Thus, the future movement of interest 
rates will affect the future claim payouts. We use the U.S. Treasury yield curves obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Database (FRED) as the risk free interest rate term structure. We use Hull and White (1990) term 
structure model to simulate 1000 paths of interest rates movement. We utilize inflation paths to calculate the 
inflation adjusted value of future losses. The chain ladder method allows us to determine the loss cash flow patterns  
for ten years. If the sum of all the inflation adjusted future payments is less than the real value of unpaid losses, we 
assume that the rest will be paid during the eleventh year. 
8 To determine the effective duration in a last step we need to calculate the present value of future payments in three 
ways as in Ahlgrim, D’Arcy and Gorvett (2004). The interest rate term structures by insurer’s credit quality are 
obtained from Bloomberg. Actually, these term structures are available only since May 2000 for three different 
credit qualities AA, A and BBB. The insurer credit rating is obtained from Best’s Key Rating Guide (A.M. Best Co). 
We use the table of correspondence between A.M Best rating scale and Bloomberg rating scale to split insurers in 
three different pools. Each pool has a different term structure. We estimate then the average spread between each 
interest rate term structure and the risk free interest rates term structure during the period 2000-2005 where data are 
available. We applied these average spreads for the missing period 1995-2000 to find out an equivalent interest term 
structure for each credit quality. 
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quantity. To calculate the present value of incurred losses we use the chain ladder parameters and the 
interest rates term structure obtained for the estimation of liabilities’ effective duration.9  
Output prices are calculated as the difference between premiums earned and the output quantity, 
expressed as a ratio to the output quantity: Output priceikt = [Premiumikt – Qikt]/Qikt, where Premium is 
premium earned, Q is the output quantity, and subscripts i, k, and t refer to insurer i, output k and year t, 
respectively. Thus for each insurer we obtain four different prices: Price of long-tail personal, Price of 
short-tail personal, Price of long-tail commercial and Price of short-tail commercial. The Price of total 
output is computed similarly. 
5.2.3. Inputs 
Insurance firms use six different inputs: administrative labour services, agent labour services, risk 
management labour services, materials and business services, debt capital, and equity capital 
Administrative labour and material/business services are used for the insurance, risk management, and 
financial intermediation activities of the insurance firms and, therefore, prices are the same. Agent labour 
services are only used for insurance activities. Risk management labour services are utilized only for the 
risk management activities. Debt capital and equity capital are inputs used only for financial management. 
The price of administrative labour services (Administrative Labour) is the average weekly wage 
in the U.S. state where the head office of the firm is located for SIC code 6331- Fire, Marine, and 
Casualty Insurers. The price of agent labour services (Agent Labour) is a weighted average of the average 
weekly wages in each State where the firm operates for SIC code 6411- Insurance agents and brokers. In 
that case, the weight is the share of premiums written in each state by the insurance firm. The price of risk 
management input (Risk Labour) is the average weekly wage in each State where the head office of the 
firm is located for the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 52392- Portfolio 
management. The price of material/business services (Business Labour) is the average weekly wage also 
                                              
9 Alternatively, we also estimated our models with the output quantities defined as the total incurred losses during 
the year plus the loss reserve adjustment, which includes in year t’s output the year t adjustment in reserves for prior 
years. The inclusion of the reserve adjustment has been used in most of the prior literature (see Cummins and Weiss. 
2000a). Because reserve adjustments are usually positive, this alternative measure of output quantities is slightly 
larger.  However, the estimates of shadow prices and efficiencies remain qualitatively the same. These additional 
estimates are available upon request. 
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in the State where the head office is located for SIC code 7300 - Business services. The SIC and NAICS 
average weekly wages used to compute prices are coming from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The price associated with debt capital (Debt Price) is defined as the required return by 
policyholders. This required return is a function of the credit quality of the insurer and the expected 
waiting time between accident occurrence and claim payment. We compute Debt Price for each insurance 
firm as the annualized interest rate equivalent to the rate on the term structure corresponding to the firm’s 
credit quality and with maturity equal to the effective duration of the insurer’s liabilities. This produces a 
different price for each insurance firm varying by its credit quality and its liability’s effective duration.10
The price associated with equity capital (Equity Price) is defined as the required return by equity 
holders. We use the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate the required returns for listed insurance 
firms on financial market.11 We assume that listed and unlisted insurers that have the same credit quality 
also have the same required return on equity. In other words, we categorize insurers by debt quality and 
take an average within each debt rating of the Fama-French cost of capital. 
Total costs (Costs) are computed as the sum of total expenses (net of loss adjustment expenses) 
and the cost of capital. The cost of capital is the sum of the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt 
capital.12 The equity capital (Equity) is defined as the sum of policyholders’ surplus and the redundant 
statutory liabilities (excess of statutory over statement reserve, unauthorized reinsurance plus the 
unearned premium reserve). The debt capital (Debt) is defined as the sum of loss reserves plus the 
unearned premium reserve. 
5.2.4. Other Variables 
Yearly dummy variables (Year96-Year03) are used to take into account of time. Also, a set of 
other dummy variables is used to account for insurer’s characteristics. Stock ownership dummy is equal to 
                                              
10 The credit quality term structures are obtained from Bloomberg, and the insurer’s credit quality is obtained from 
Best’s Key Rating Guide (A.M. Best Co). 
11 We split listed insurers into three groups based on their A.M. Best’s rating. In every year, we estimate the cost of 
equity capital for each group. The prices of the Fama-French three risk factors were obtained from Kenneth French’s 
website. 
12 The cost of equity capital is the average quantity of equity capital hold by the insurer during the year multiplied by 
Equity price. The cost of debt capital is the average quantity of debt capital hold by the insurer during the year 
multiplied by Debt price. 
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1 for stock insurer and equal to 0 otherwise. Group dummy is equal to 1 if the insurer is member of a 
group of insurers and equal to 0 otherwise. We define six dummy variables to account the insurer credit 
quality. Class 1 dummy is equal to 1 if insurer’s rating is A + + or A +. Class 2 dummy is equal to 1 if 
insurer’s rating is A. Class 3 dummy is equal to 1 if insurer’s rating is A −. Class 4 dummy is equal to 1 if 
insurer’s rating is B + + or B +. Class 5 dummy is equal to 1 if insurer’s rating is B. Class 6 dummy is 
equal to 1 if insurer’s rating is B −. 
5.3. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1 for two different samples of insurers. 
The first sample, called Sample 1, represents larger insurers that produce positive output in each of the 
four lines: Long- and Short-tail personal and Long- and Short-tail commercial. 612 US insurers 
representing 3,303 observations are contained in this sample. Firms in this sample account for xyz percent 
of total property-liability premiums written in 2003. When we look at size variables such as Equity, Debt 
and Assets we observe that these insurers are about twice the size of those in the total available population 
composed of 1,636 insurers and 9,129 observations (Sample 2). A third sample of insurers also is 
analyzed as a robustness check. This sample represents 1,013 insurers totalizing 5,549 observations. 
6.  Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of two models. Model 1 is the one which is closer to the 
literature reference model used to compute cost efficiency (Berger, 1993; Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 
1997, and their references). In this model, the coefficients associated with the intermediate outputs are 
fixed. Model 2 corresponds to the translog model of Equation (14) with random coefficients associated 
with the two intermediate outputs. Estimation results are similar to Model 1 with two exceptions. Indeed, 
we observe that the coefficients of the two intermediate outputs are much higher in absolute values in 
Model 2, although they have the same signs and statistical significance. A negative coefficient for 
Invested assets means that the financial intermediation activity decreases the insurance activity costs. This 
result is in line with the theoretical model (Equation 5) where it is shown that financial management may 
create additional value added when some conditions are satisfied. A positive coefficient for Asset-liability 
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risk is also in line with the theoretical model (Equation 7) where it is shown that risk management may 
have a positive value on the insurer’s value added since it reduces the solvency risk. A positive coefficient 
means that high risk insurers (those with less risk management activities) have higher insurance costs. 
Table 3 presents results with larger samples using a single output measure in the specification. As 
already discussed, in Models 1 and 2 we used only insurers which have strictly positive outputs in the 
four lines of business. This reduced considerably the numbers of observations. Therefore, both for 
robustness and market representation, we extended the analysis to a higher number of insurers by 
summing up the four output variables into a single one. In Model 3, we use the same number of 
observations as in Model 2 for the sake of comparison. In this specification, there is a single aggregated 
output along with two output quality variables (Proportion of personal and Proportion of long tail). This 
procedure was often used in models for inferring technological parameters in the transportation industry 
(see, for instance, Dionne, Gagné and Vanasse, 1998). The two qualitative variables are statistically 
significant and indicate that insurers more involved in personal lines have lower costs while those more 
involved in long tail lines have higher costs. It is interesting to observe that the coefficients associated 
with the two intermediate outputs variables keep the same sign although their magnitudes change. In 
Model 4, the results are obtained with 5,549 observations and in model 5 with 9,129 observations. In this 
last model, we dropped the output quality variables because many insurers are not present in personal or 
long tail lines. Again the results are quite robust. 
One particularity of our econometric model is related to the shadow prices of the intermediate 
outputs. Since these two outputs are not traded on markets but inside the firms, they are not directly 
observable but can be estimated. Estimated shadow prices are illustrated in Figure 1 for risk management 
and in Figure 2 for financial intermediation using the parameter estimates of Model 2 (with 612 insurers 
in the sample).13 In both cases, the average shadow price is positive indicating that, on average, insurance 
firms in the sample could reduce their costs further by increasing their level of risk and financial 
                                              
13 Even if shadow prices are computed for each observation in the sample (3,303 observations), Figures 1 and 2 
report the firm-average shadow prices (612 firms). For risk management activities, the results correspond to negative 
value obtained from Equation 15 because increasing risk management decreases asset-liability risk. 
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management activities. This observation is, of course, consistent with the empirical results presented in 
Table 2 (Model 2) where the fixed part of the coefficients associated with the two intermediate outputs 
are statistically significant. Figures 1 and 2 also reveal that several insurers are quite far from an optimal 
level of risk and financial management activities and could further reduce their costs significantly by 
increasing these activities. The same figures also reveal that a few firms are over-producing risk 
management and financial intermediation activities (negative price values) and could therefore reduce 
their costs by reducing the level of these activities. 
Insurance-pooling efficiency results are presented in Table 4. We look at the efficiency measures 
computed from the estimates of the five empirical models considered in our analysis. Efficiency (1) is 
defined by equation (17) and is relative to the most efficient firm in the sample. Efficiency (2) is defined 
by equation (18) and is relative to the least efficient firm in the sample. For all models, the results are 
quite consistent: cost differences between 44 and 60% on average compared to the most efficient firms 
and cost differences between 39 and 55% compared to the least efficient firm. Limiting our analysis to 
our preferred model (Model 2), we can see that, on average, firms in the sample have costs which are 49% 
higher than the most efficient firm in the sample, everything else being equal. Alternatively, we also see 
that, on average, firms in the sample have costs which are 55% lower than the less efficient firm in the 
sample used (612 observations) again, everything else being equal. These efficiency measurements must 
be interpreted as overall insurance-pooling activity efficiency. 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper tests the role of risk management and financial intermediation activities in value 
creation by analyzing three samples of U.S. property-liability insurers over the period 1995-2003. We 
argue that risk management and financial intermediation are activities that may be used by insurers to 
improve efficiency, where efficiency is gauged by the capacity to reduce the costs of providing insurance. 
We measure insurer efficiency by estimating an econometric cost frontier. Because risk management and 
financial intermediation are key activities for insurers, we treat these activities as endogenous. And, 
because the prices of risk management and financial intermediation services are not observable, we 
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consider these two activities as intermediate outputs and estimate their shadow prices. The shadow prices 
are then used to isolate the contributions of risk management and financial intermediation to insurer cost 
efficiency, as measured by their capacity to reduce costs. 
The paper also contributes to the prior literature by developing a theoretical model of value-added 
in the property-liability insurance industry. This is important because output estimation for financial 
services firms has been based primarily on the value-added approach in the recent literature. Our model 
represents a significant extension and generalization of prior models of value-added in the insurance 
industry. The two most important generalizations are to incorporate the role of solvency risk as a 
determinant of demand for insurance to explicitly add risk management as part of value added. We also 
generalize prior models with respect to the financial intermediation function. 
The final important contribution of this paper is to introduce a new approach for the estimation of 
efficiency, which is particularly appropriate for financial institutions. The econometric methodology, 
borrowed from the exhaustible resources literature (Halvorsen and Smith, 1991; Chermak and Patrick, 
2001), enables us to estimate the shadow prices of risk management and financial intermediation and 
thereby to show their contribution to insurer cost efficiency. The estimation of shadow prices is 
particularly important for financial institutions because many of the services provided by such firms are 
intangible and not explicitly priced.  This is the case for services provided by both insurers and banks, 
such as risk management and financial intermediation and also for products such as demand deposits, 
which bundle together a variety of services, most of which are priced implicitly. Thus, our methodology 
is a promising approach that could be used more widely to analyze financial institutions. 
The empirical results clearly indicate that risk management and financial intermediation 
contribute significantly to enhancing efficiency for property-liability insurers. The average shadow price 
for both services is positive, indicating that, on average, insurance firms in the sample could reduce their 
costs further by increasing their level of risk management and financial intermediation activities. The 
results also reveal that several insurers are quite far from an optimal level of risk management and 
financial intermediation activities and could further reduce their costs significantly by increasing these 
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activities. However, a few firms are over-producing these intermediate outputs and could therefore 
improve their efficiency by reducing the level of these activities. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Cost Function Estimation: 1995−2003 
 Sample 1 (3,303 observations) 
Sample 2 
(9,129 observations) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Intermediate Outputs  
Invested assets 1,583.92 5,697.63 0,644.63 3,516.55 
Asset-liability risk 14,775.70 57,897.15 5,960.91 35,606.04 
Output Quantities and Output Prices  
Long-tail personal  191.52 1,027.95 70.54 625.06 
Short-tail personal 86.66 471.24 32.63 286.90 
Long-tail commercial 165.53 533.87 68.39 331.02 
Short-tail commercial 42.94 139.57 21.01 110.71 
Total output 486.65 1851.91 192.57 1,139.48 
Proportion of personal 0.5489 0.3214 0.3758 0.3904 
Proportion of long-tail 0.7163 0.1723 0.6909 0.3277 
Price of long-tail personal 0.4482 1.0919 0.2895 1.0171 
Price of short-tail personal 0.5587 1.3003 0.4071 2.0543 
Price of long-tail commercial 1.3674 7.5824 1.2734 8.5475 
Price of short-tail commercial 0.9516 2.8124 4.0145 162.6139 
Price of total output 0.4940 0.4168 3.5011 162.3953 
Inputs Prices  
Administrative labour 948.60 172.48 943.96 164.69 
Agent labour 802.11 152.1 811.04 157.92 
Risk labour 2,073.07 1,129.41 2,035.99 1,065.63 
Material/Business labour 614.04 197.34 603.75 183.46 
Debt Price 0.0576 0.0181 0.0586 0.0185 
Equity Price 0.1684 0.064 0.1777 0.0722 
Others  
Equity 890.93 3,643.78 362.81 2,241.21 
Debt 1,210.84 3,964.75 487.61 2,458.77 
Assets 1,902.72 6,920.67 777.06 4,325.34 
Total costs 432.47 1,503.19 172.91 927.15 
Number of observations 3,303 9,129 
Number of insurers 612 1,634 
 
Note: Quantities of intermediate outputs, quantities of outputs and assets are in millions of real 1995 
dollars. Equity, Debt and Total costs are in million of current dollars. 
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TABLE 2 
Models specified with four outputs. 
Model 1: only the intercept is random. 
Model 2: random intercept and random coefficients for Invested assets and Asset-liability risk. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Intercept 12.9777 293.16 12.9032 232.61 
Invested assets −0.4043 −3.01 −0.5428 −3.50 
Asset-liability risk 0.4066 3.32 0.5539 3.83 
Long-tail personal  0.2322 14.72 0.2065 13.56 
Short-tail personal 0.1541 9.74 0.1391 9.22 
Long-tail commercial 0.2700 21.53 0.2637 21.79 
Short-tail commercial 0.1569 10.76 0.1246 8.63 
Agent labour 0.4172 2.71 0.5502 3.46 
Risk labour −0.0383 −0.77 −0.0227 −0.45 
Business labour −0.0031 −0.03 −0.0376 −0.39 
Debt price 0.0930 1.04 0.1269 1.50 
Equity price 0.2689 5.86 0.2195 5.22 
Year96 −0.0855 −5.44 −0.0734 −5.52 
Year97 0.0209 1.24 0.0080 0.54 
Year98 −0.0092 −0.38 −0.0278 −1.26 
Year99 0.0476 1.78 0.0128 0.51 
Year00 0.0229 0.84 0.0172 0.68 
Year01 −0.0505 −0.88 −0.0236 −0.42 
Year02 0.0247 0.29 −0.0080 −0.10 
Year03 0.0566 0.52 0.0025 0.02 
Number of observations 3,303   3,303   
Number of insurers 612  612  
−2 Log Likelihood 1,113.2  592.9  
 
Note: Second-order terms are not presented but are available upon request. We present here estimated t 
ratios. In the case of Model 2, simulated t ratios give the same results regarding the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients. These simulation results are also available upon request. 
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TABLE 1’ 
Other Control Variables 
 Sample 1 (3,303 observations) 
Sample 2 
(9,129 observations) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dummy variables  
Group dummy (= 1 if group member) 0.6691 0.4706 0.4116 0.4922 
Stock ownership dummy (= 1 if stock insurer) 0.5235 0.4996 0.5395 0.4985 
Class 1 (= 1 if insurer rating is A++ or A+) 0.2095 0.407 0.0957 0.2942 
Class 2 (= 1 if insurer rating is A) 0.2452 0.4303 0.1784 0.3829 
Class 3 (= 1 if insurer rating is A -)  0.2322 0.4223 0.2047 0.4035 
Class 4 (= 1 if insurer rating is B++ or B+) 0.1674 0.3734 0.1799 0.3841 
Class 5 (= 1 if insurer rating is B) 0.0424 0.2015 0.0381 0.1915 
Class 6 (= 1 if insurer rating is B -) 0.0233 0.1509 0.0205 0.1420 
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TABLE 3 
Models specified with aggregated outputs 
Model 3: random intercept and coefficients for 3303 observations 
Model 4: random intercept and coefficients for 5549 observations 
Model 5: random intercept and coefficients for 9129 observations 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio 
Intercept 12.8947 289.22 12.3759 303.49 11.8097 266.00 
Invested assets −1.1799 −8.14 −0.5352 −4.45 −1.3444 −9.57 
Asset-liability risk 1.1401 8.45 0.5971 5.35 1.3502 10.66 
Total output 0.8736 60.19 0.8870 74.89 0.7963 74.43 
Proportion of personal −0.1026 −5.87 −0.0705 −5.27   
Proportion of long tail 0.1422 2.97 0.1010 3.28   
Agent labour 0.5716 3.96 0.5408 3.96 0.3606 2.93 
Risk labour −0.0454 −1.00 −0.0543 −1.25 −0.0285 −0.72 
Business labour −0.0308 −0.35 0.0388 0.46 −0.1557 −2.02 
Debt price 0.3208 4.20 0.1147 1.72 0.2288 4.57 
Equity price 0.1999 5.24 0.2292 6.30 0.3268 10.45 
Year96 −0.0389 −3.32 −0.0277 −2.42 −0.0076 −0.81 
Year97 −0.0119 −0.88 0.0359 2.87 0.0169 1.55 
Year98 −0.0457 −2.28 −0.0092 −0.51 −0.0179 −1.13 
Year99 −0.0425 −1.86 0.0168 0.89 0.0202 1.38 
Year00 0.0269 1.21 0.0050 0.25 0.0620 3.67 
Year01 0.0973 1.95 −0.0520 −1.21 0.0944 3.00 
Year02 0.1663 2.26 −0.0188 −0.30 0.1450 3.10 
Year03 0.1616 1.75 0.0799 0.96 0.2582 4.00 
Number of observations 3,303 5,549 9,129 
Number of insurers 612 1,013 1,643 
−2 Log Likelihood −262.8 1,767.1 5,097.1 
 
Note: Second-order terms are not presented but are available upon request. 
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TABLE 4 
Insurance-pooling Efficiency Results 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Model 1 
Efficiency(1) 612 0.559867 0.205727 0.249078 1 
Efficiency(2) 612 0.486696 0.203126 0 0.750922 
Model 2 
Efficiency(1) 612 0.490595 0.223183 0.178848 1 
Efficiency(2) 612 0.546886 0.223238 0 0.821152 
Model 3 
Efficiency(1) 612 0.600591 0.169435 0.334478 1 
Efficiency(2) 612 0.397756 0.171169 0 0.665523 
Model 4 
Efficiency(1) 1,013 0.580427 0.167901 0.327887 1 
Efficiency(2) 1,013 0.389026 0.170473 0 0.672113 
Model 5 
Efficiency(1) 1,643 0.448392 0.218786 0.16348 1 
Efficiency(2) 1,643 0.541521 0.224196 0 0.83652 
 
Notes: 
Efficiency(1) is obtained from equation (17). 
Efficiency(2) is obtained from equation (18). 
The results are obtained from truncated measures, as in Berger (1993). We set the top and bottom 5% to 
the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively, of their distribution. 
 32
  
Shadow prices for risk management (10-2) 
 
Figure 1. The shadow prices for risk management. These prices are obtained from equation (15) 
applied to Model 2. The mean of the shadow prices for risk management is 0.0552. 
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Shadow prices for financial intermediation (10-2) 
 
Figure 2. The shadow prices for financial intermediation. These prices are obtained from equation 
(16) applied to Model 2. The mean of the shadow prices for financial intermediation is 0.0967. 
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Appendix 
 
In a first step, we assume that there is a solvency risk but the insurer does not use any risk 
management activity. We propose the following notation: 
p is the probability of the solvency risk; 
er  is the required return by equity holders; 
r  is the required return by policyholders; 
ar  is the investment return; 
qe  is the insurer expenses for risk pooling and financial management as proportion of expected 
insurance coverage Q; it is paid even when the insurer is insolvent. 
So, the premium can be written as: 
( )( )1
(1 )
− + += +
e qp Q r E e QP
r
. 
The corresponding value added is: 
( )( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )a e q a erV p Q r E e Q r E p Qr+= − + + + − − − −+ p r E , 
or equivalently to: 
(1 )( )e q q aV m p Q r E e Q e Q r E⎡ ⎤= − + + + +⎣ ⎦ , 
where 
11
1
arm
r
++ = + ;  when 0>m ar r> .
We now assume that the insurer uses risk management to reduce the solvency risk. We define: 
h as the hedging ratio; 
( )1−p h  as the new default probability of solvency risk; 
he  measures expenses for hedging; it is proportional to hedging ratio and expected insurance coverage; 
= +qh q he e he ; 
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er  is the required return by equity holders.  is the same as before because equity holders diversify their 
solvency risk in financial markets. In other words, they can diversify the specific risk by themselves; 
er
hr  is the new required return by policyholders. When  then 0>h <hr r .
When the default risk decreases, policyholders reduce their required return because they are less 
exposed to the solvency risk. 
11
1
++ = +h p
rr
m
 
Since  then  (when h = 0 we get ≤hr r 0≥pm 0pm = ). 
The insurance premium becomes: 
( )( )1
(1 )
− + + += +
e qh
PFM
h
p ph Q r E e Q
P
r
 
( )( ) ( )1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
− + + + += + ++ +
e q h e
PFM p
h
p Q r E e Q Qhe ph Q r E
P m
r r
 
( )
(1 )
+ += + + +
h e
PFM p
h
he Q ph Q r E
P P m P
r
 
As a result policyholders are ready to pay an extra premium to reduce the solvency risk. The 
value added becomes: 
(1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )( )
(1 )
a
PFM e qh a e
h
rV p ph Q r E e Q r E p ph Q r E
r
+ ⎡ ⎤= − + + + + − − + +⎣ ⎦+ . 
We can write: 
1 1 1(1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 1 1
a a
r p
h h
r r rm m
r r r
+ + += + = × = + ++ + + m . 
Setting: 
(1 )= + + eW Q e r E , 
we obtain: 
 36
(1 )PFM r qh qh aV m p ph W e Q e Q r⎡ ⎤= − + + + +⎣ ⎦ E  
(1 ) [ ]PFM r q r h hq aV m p W e Q m phW he Q e Q r E⎡ ⎤= − + + + + +⎣ ⎦  
(1 ) (1 )[(1 ) ] [ ]PFM q q a p q r h hV m p W e Q e Q r E m m p W e Q m phW he Q he Q⎡ ⎤= − + + + + + − + + + +⎣ ⎦  
(1 )[(1 ) ] [ ]= + + − + + + +PFM p q r h hV V m m p W e Q m phW he Q he Q  
So the net value added of risk management is equal to: 
(1 )[(1 ) ] [ ] 0− = + − + + + + >PFM p h r h hV V m m p W e Q m phW he Q he Q  
when  since  when . 0>rm 0>pm 0>h
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